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Abstract 
Investments in the Human Capital of the Socially Disadvantaged 
Children – Effects on Redistribution 
Tim Lohse, Peter F. Lutz and Christian Thomann 
Recently, early investments in the human capital of children from socially disadvantaged 
environments have attracted a great deal of attention. Programs of such early 
intervention, aiming at children's health and well-being, are spreading considerably in the 
U.S. and are currently tested in several European countries. In a discrete version of the 
Mirrlees model with a parents' and a children's generation we show the intra-generational 
and the inter-generational redistributional consequences of such intervention programs. 
It turns out that the parents' generation always loses when such intervention programs 
are implemented. Among the children's generation it is the rich who always benefit. 
Despite the expectation that early intervention puts the poor descendants in a better 
position, our analysis reveals that the poor among the children's generation may even be 
worse off if the effect of early intervention on their productivity is not large enough. 
Keywords: Early Intervention, welfare, redistribution, taxation 
JEL classification: I38, J13, H21, I141 Introduction
Health economics considers health as a component of human capital that is
improved by investments and depreciated over time (Grossman, 2000). The
economic theory of human development describes skill formation as a dynamic
process where early investments largely determine the productivity of inputs
later in the life cycle, integrating knowledge of other sciences like developmental
psychology (Cunha and Heckman, 2008). Recently, the human capital model of
health economics and the theory of skill formation were assembled to a lifecycle
investment framework (Heckman, 2007). This uni…ed framework points to the
importance of early investments in the human capital of children growing up in
socially disadvantaged environments. However, threefold market failure keeps
these children from getting an e¢cient amount of investments (Cunha and Heck-
man, 2007). Therefore early childhood intervention programs were developed
which are publicly …nanced inputs into the skill formation processes of very
young children. These interventions are carried out, for example, by specialized
family nurses whose work starts with monitoring the mother’s health conditions
even before she gives birth.1 Evaluations in randomized trials indicate that
some of these programs give children growing up in socially disadvantaged envi-
ronments a better life, and, at the same time, provide a pay-o¤ for the taxpayer
(Karoly et al., 1998). At the moment only a small fraction of those popula-
tions that could bene…t from these programs is receiving them. However, these
programs are spreading with considerable speed in the U.S. (Olds, 2002).2 At-
tracted from the proven outcomes in the U.S. several European countries started
testing early intervention programs in randomized controlled trials (RCTs).3
1The positive e¤ects pf prenatal home visitation by nurses on pregnancy outcomes have
been documented e.g. by Kitzman et al. (1997).
2Nurse Family Partnership, for instance, started its replication process in 1996 and is now
operating in 324 counties in 25 U.S. States (Nurse Family Partnership Foundation, 2008).
3In Germany "Pro Kind" is in operation since 2006, carrying out a RCT with 740 par-
ticipants (of whom 370 are controls), in France "CAPEDP" is undertaking a RCT with 440
participants, in Italy "Scommettiamo sui giovani" is a RCT with 100 participants and Ireland’s
"preparing for life" has 200 participants. In the United Kingdom, "Family Nurse Partner-
ship", a RCT with no less than 2400 participants was announced by the Department of Health
in 2008.
2If the outcomes of the RCTs in Europe are as positive as in the U.S., an imple-
mentation across a broad front can be expected. In this case, these implementa-
tions will a¤ect the redistributive equilibrium of society which is characterized
by optimally balancing equity gains from redistribution against e¢ciency losses
from taxation where taxes are used to …nance redistribution. The aim of this pa-
per is to analyze in a Mirrleesian framework (Mirrlees, 1971) the redistributional
consequences of broadly applied early childhood intervention. We use a discrete
variant of the Mirrlees model (Stiglitz, 1982; Homburg, 2001) to build an econ-
omy with two generations, namely a parents’ generation (…rst generation) and a
children’s generation (second generation) whose welfare is jointly maximized. In
this model we can determine the welfare maximizing amount of early interven-
tion. Redistributional consequences occur not only within the same generation
(intra-generational), but also between the two generations (inter-generational).
In both generations there are poor and rich individuals. The parents’ generation
…nances early childhood intervention and thus increases the skills and therefore
the productivity of their eligible children later in life. The bene…ts from inter-
vention are twofold: First, there is a positive output e¤ect on those who receive
intervention programs because their productivity increases. Second, there is a
positive incentive e¤ect, i.e. early intervention relaxes the incentive compatibil-
ity constraint between rich and poor individuals in the children’s generation. To
specify the changes in the utility positions of the two generations we compare
two optimal tax-transfer schemes, one without, and one with early childhood
intervention. Our main results can be summarized as follows: The parents’
generation always loses in welfare terms when such intervention programs are
optimally implemented. However, the children’s generation always bene…ts in
total. But, despite the expectation. that early intervention improves the posi-
tion of the children sponsored, i.e. the poor children, our analysis shows that
it is the children who are not sponsored, i.e. the rich ones, bene…t most. In
contrast, those who are sponsored are faced with a transfer reduction and must
participate fully in the labor market which decreases their leisure. This could
even result in their being worse o¤.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 refers to the
related literature and section 3 presents the model. Some basic results are
3provided in section 4 and our main theoretical …ndings are given in section 5.
Some illustrative examples are provided in section 6, and section 7 summarizes
the …ndings and concludes.
2 Human capital formation and the Mirrleesian
economy
Early parental investment in their children’s skills and health seem to be very im-
portant in promoting noncognitive skills (Cunha and Heckman, 2008). Noncog-
nitive skills in turn promote the acquisition of cognitive skills e.g. by making
children more curious and more open to learning. Hence, noncognitive skills and
cognitive skills are equally important with respect to a child’s future social and
economic success (Heckman et al., 2006). Moreover, there is a longterm in‡u-
ence fo initial conditions in childhood on health for the rest of the life (Tubeuf
and Jusot, 2011).
But, even if childhood is an important and sensitive period for investment in
skills, this does not justify publicly …nanced intervention in the skill forma-
tion process. For this purpose, some kind of market failure must be taken into
account. There are, as Cunha and Heckman (2007) point out, three distinct
constraints that operate on the family and its children. (1) The inability of
a child to choose its parents. This is the fundamental constraint imposed by
the accident of birth. (2) The inability of parents to borrow against their chil-
dren’s future income in order to …nance investment in them. (3) The inability
of parents to borrow against their own income to …nance investment in their
children.
While the …rst constraint justi…es child welfare activities in general, the other
two also justify special intervention in families where the credit constraint is
already binding. This conclusion corresponds with those of several studies in
the U.S. that show that early intervention programs only generate a high …scal
surplus if they are restricted to low income families. Olds et al. (1993), for
example, who tested the Nurse Family Partnership Program in several RCTs,
found that, in that case, the costs of the program were outweighed by additional
4tax revenues and public savings four years after the children were born. If the
program was not restricted to low income families, only about half of the costs
would be regained after four years. Karoly et al. (1998) studied the e¤ects of
this program …fteen years after the birth of children, where the bene…ts exceed a
multiple of the costs in the low income group, while the bene…ts in the low risk
group are still less than the costs. While these studies con…rm the theoretical
underinvestment in socially disadvantaged children, they are not indicative of
what will happen if the programs are broadly applied and productivity of the
disadvantaged is raised at an aggregate level.4
Problems of this kind can be analyzed with help of the Mirrlees model, and, in
fact, there are several extensions of this model in which human capital formation
is considered. In an early contribution by Ulph (1977), income redistribution
and educational policies are optimized simultaneously. Ulph’s model assumes
that the government is informed about individual abilities when allocating edu-
cational resources, while our model assumes that such information is not known
for either the purposes of taxation or for early intervention. There appears
to be no reason for assuming that government can observe abilities accurately
when it comes to early intervention, but, at the same time, is unable to observe
abilities for the purpose of taxation. As in practice, we assume early interven-
tion programs applying screening instruments or inclusion criteria to identify
promising intervention candidates. These screening instruments contribute to
the overall e¢ciency of an early intervention technology. The e¢ciency serves
as a parameter in our model. Again as in practice, the instruments are far from
being perfect and not usable for the purpose of lump-sum taxation later in life.5
Tuomala (1986) considers three ways of incorporating human capital formation
into the design of optimal income tax policy. First he takes the case of uniform
compulsory provision of education by the government. This does not apply here,
4O’Neill et al. (2011) report about favourable long-run economic returns of early interven-
tion programs which reduce childhood health inequalities. However, it is not clear that these
results carry over to the broader context of socially disadvanteged children.
5An extension of Ulph’s model by Hare and Ulph (1979) introduces a private education
market that provides perfect substitutes for publicly provided education. This facet of the
problem is not relevant in our case, since the two credit constraints mentioned above prevent
recipients of early intervention from buying skill investment in the private market.
5since early intervention is restricted to children at risk. In his second case, each
individual makes his own educational choice without knowing his own ability,
while our families do not make educational choices and know their abilities. In
a third case, individuals make distinct labor supply and education decisions on
the basis of known abilities. In our model, the grown-ups decide about their
labor supply while the government implements early intervention before, namely
when they are still children.
In a one-period model, Brett and Weymark (2003) consider government ex-
penditures on education as an instrument for redistribution in addition to the
income tax. A compulsory amount of education is exogenously determined, and
individuals may choose additional training. Using a type aggregator, individ-
uals di¤er not only with respect to their innate ability, but also with respect
to their aptitude to acquire skills. Brett and Weymark focus on the sign of
marginal tax rates and show that these can even be negative. However, they do
not explain speci…c utility changes that occur due to the introduction of educa-
tion. Blumkin and Sadka (2008) extend Brett and Weymark’s (2003) model and
show how the discretionary individual decisions to acquire education can serve
as another signal, in addition to income, for the unobserved productivity. They
show, in a linear tax system, that taxing (rather than subsidizing) education
can therefore be optimal.
Boadway and Marchand (1995) analyze, in a Stiglitz (1982) type model, the use
of public expenditures such as education for redistributive purposes. They …nd
that public education can improve welfare but do not specify how the utility
positions of the types a¤ected change. The level of education, moreover, is not
endogenous.
A more recent contribution is by Jacobs (2005), who incorporates human capital
formation into the theory of optimal linear income taxation by introducing a
trade-o¤ between time spent on labor and the time and goods spent on private
education. He shows that, in that case, for the class of iso-elastic utility functions
the costs of distortionary taxation increase substantially. But this scenario does
not apply to early intervention, as this takes place in the early childhood where
no trade-o¤ with labor supply is possible. A new variant of the Mirrlees model
is therefore required to analyze our problem.
63 The model
A …nite variant of the standard optimal non-linear taxation model (Stiglitz,
1982; Homburg, 2001) is extended by a second period. The variety of skills
in society consists of two types, rich and poor. In the …rst period, poor and
rich (h = p;r) individuals of the parents’ generation are working whereas their
children are not. In the second period the parents’ generation is no longer
alive and the children are grown up and working. Poor and rich types among
the children’s generation are denoted by h = P;R. To keep things as general
as possible, we make no assumption about the transmission of types across
generations. As a result, the model is open to the coherency described in the
skill formation literature (e.g. Cunha et al. 2006), in which rich parents are
more likely to raise highly skilled children because parental investment is larger.
On the other side, the model also allows for exceptions to that rule, since these
might also occur. Because of this, it is not possible for the government to derive
the descendant’s type from that of the parents. The shares of the grown up
poor and rich remain unchanged over the periods and denoted by f and f,
respectively, with f+f = 1:
Poor and rich types di¤er in their productivities. The productivity of the rich
is exogenous and constant over time, wr = wR: Conversely, the productivity
of the second-generation poor can bene…t from an early intervention program
g ￿ 0 which takes place in the …rst period, when they are children. This pro-
gram has to be …nanced by taxes. In the second period, when the poor among
the second generation are able to work, their productivity is improved by an
intervention technology i(g) and is given by wP(g) = wp+i(g) with wP0(g) > 0,
but wP0(g) = 0 for g ! 1, wP00(g) < 0. As in reality, early intervention may
mitigate, but not eliminate, social inequality, such that wP(g) < wr for all
g. Early intervention for the rich does not pay, i.e. wR(g) = wR. The result-
ing productivities correspond to wage rates in the competitive labor market.
An individual consuming ch and earning a gross labor income yh enjoys util-
ity u(ch;yh=wh): The argument yh=wh is the time type h spends in the labor
market to generate the income yh: It must hold that yh=wh is smaller than an
exogenous upper time limit. As the government is uninformed about the produc-
7tivities and cannot observe working time, the problem is denoted in the variables
that the government can observe, that is, by using c and y as choice variables.
Consumption corresponds to net income since the only kind of taxation is the
taxation of labor income. Income taxes follow as Th = yh ￿ ch, where a neg-
ative di¤erence indicates a transfer. For convenience, partial derivatives of the
utility function u are denoted with subscripts that refer to the respective argu-
ments, i.e. uc and uy. The utility function satis…es the usual properties (strictly
monotonically increasing in c, strictly monotonically decreasing in y; and Hess
u is negative de…nite). For simplicity we assume vanishing cross-derivatives
ucy = uyc = 0. Consequently, leisure is non-inferior, and this ensures that re-
distribution is from the rich to the poor. The intra-periodical marginal rate
of substitution of an individual with productivity wh is de…ned in an income-
consumption space as mrsh(ch;yh=wh) := ￿uy(ch;yh=wh)=(uc(ch;yh=wh)wh).
We assume mrs(c;0) < wr for c small.
The government imposes an optimal g for the …rst period and chooses an opti-
mal tax-transfer scheme for both periods simultaneously. We assume that the
government can perfectly commit.6
The government’s welfare maximization problem reads:
max!
g;(ch;yh)h=p;r;P;R
W = u(cp;yp=wp)f + u(cr;yr=wr)f (1)
+u(cP;yP=wP(g))f + u(cR;yR=wR)f
s.t. g ￿ (yp ￿ cp)f + (yr ￿ cr)f; (2)



























This problem can be interpreted as follows: the government maximizes the
expected utility of an individual from behind a veil of ignorance, i.e. of someone
who knows the entire model but neither knows the period in which he is going
to live nor does he know to which of the two types he will belong. Someone
6Commitment problems in the context of educational investments are analysed e.g. by
Boadway, Marceau and Marchand (1996).
8deciding under a veil of ignorance will consider each feasible allocation to be
a lottery in which he will receive a bundle (ch;yh) with a certain probability
after the veil is lifted. The resulting scheme, and the optimal level of early
intervention, are determined by risk aversion and the deadweight losses from
taxation.
For the sake of clarity, any other inter-generational redistribution, that possibly
blurs the redistributional e¤ects of early intervention, is excluded. That is, we
assume a situation of Ricardian equivalence, where inter-generational redistrib-
ution is perfectly impeded via borrowing or saving. For simplicity, we implement
this assumption by refraining from of any saving or borrowing. Therefore, max-
imization has to occur subject to the two budget constraints (2) and (3), one
for each period. The parents’ generation has to …nance the provision of early
childhood intervention at the level of g with its taxes.
The second-best approach to optimal income taxation holds that the government
is unable to observe productivities and working hours directly.7 So, stipulating
a tax schedule means confronting the individuals with legal choices of (c;y):
For example, the rich in the second period only accept the bundle (cR;yR)
intended for them if they are not better o¤ by pretending to be the poor, i.e. by
choosing consumption cP and a labor time of yP=wR. The opposite applies to
the poor. As these have participated in the early intervention program during
childhood, i.e. in the …rst period, they mimic the rich by choosing consumption
cR and working time yR=wP(g). Therefore, every feasible allocation must also
satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints (4) and (5). Of course, an inter-
generational imitation, i.e. a mimicking of members of the …rst generation by
those of the second and vice versa, is not possible.
As usual in discrete tax models, we have two di¤erent marginal tax rates. The
7One could argue, that, because the type of the parents is revealed in the …rst period, a
clever government would try to infer the type of the children from the type of the parents
and, hence, realize …rst best taxation in the second period. But if we take a closer look on the
requirements of taxation, the type would have to be not only observable but also veri…able.
It is in fact a classical case of an observable but not veri…able event as described in Hart
and Moore (1990). Taxation a¤ects the basic right of property and therefore has to be in
accordance with the rules of law. Since the government could only guess but never prove that
a descendant of a rich parent is of the type r, it is still con…ned to the second best world.
9discrete marginal tax rates, which in our model only apply to the rich, are
de…ned for any yh 6= yk as
mr =
Tr ￿ Tp
yr ￿ yp and mR =
TR ￿ TP
yR ￿ yP : (6)
The discrete marginal tax rate is the relevant marginal rate for the purpose of
redistribution. For conventional reasons, we will denote the local (or implicit)
marginal tax rates by T0h. These are given by
T0h = 1 ￿ mrsh: (7)
They are the crucial marginal tax rates for incentive considerations and specify
by how much the marginal rate of substitution falls short of the wage rate.
4 Basic features of optimal allocations
Proposition 1 answers the fundamental question whether the optimization prob-
lem stated is solvable.
Proposition 1 There exists a non-trivial solution to the maximization problem
speci…ed in (1) to (5):
Proof. The set of feasible bundles (g;ch;yh)h=p;r;P;R; which is determined
by the resource constraints, is compact. The self-selection constraints de…ne
a closed subset of this compact set, which in turn is itself compact. The set
is not empty: in the absence of taxes, at least r and R are at work, since
mrs(c;0) < wr by assumption. Introducing a tax with small revenue does not
change the decision of the rich and, by continuity, does not violate any self-
selection constraint. The existence of a non-trivial optimum follows from the
Weierstraß theorem.
For the optimal level of early childhood intervention g￿, the following proposition
holds.
Proposition 2 The welfare maximizing level of early childhood intervention,


















10Proof. Since we assume that inter-generational redistribution occurs only via
early intervention g, some results from the standard optimal tax analysis apply.
There is no output surplus in any optimum , i.e. the governmental budget
constraints (2) and (3) are binding. Moreover, due to the redistribution from
the rich to the poor, the downward incentive compatibility constraints in (4) and
(5) are binding, whereas there is some slack in the upward constraints. As the
upward constraints are satis…ed automatically (so called chain property), they
can be ignored. As the gradients of the constraints are linearly independent, a
Lagrangian approach can be formulated. Let ￿1 and ￿2 be the non-negative
multipliers for the two binding budget constraints (2) and (3), and ￿1 and ￿2
multipliers of the downward binding incentive compatibility constraints of (4)
and (5), respectively (Bertsekas, 1999; Homburg, 2003). Let
L = u(cp;yp=wp)f + u(cr;yr=wr)f + u(cP;yP=wP(g))f + u(cR;yR=wR)f
+￿1
￿



















be the associated Lagrangian. The partial derivatives of (9) with respect to























Dividing (11) and (12) by the respective partial derivative of the utility function,





Substituting for ￿1 according to equation (13) into (10) and rearranging terms
leads to (8).
The optimality condition (8) speci…es a cost-bene…t equalization. The left-hand
side of (8) describes a positive leisure e¤ect for the second-generation poor.
11The …rst fraction is the percentage increase in the productivity that is due to
early intervention. This increase is scaled by its working time measured in its
negative disutility of labor. The entire e¤ect is weighted by the size of the
poor in the population. The right-hand side shows the marginal budgetary
costs of early intervention which only accrue to the parents’ generation. The
marginal costs are given as an average of the marginal utility of consumption of
both parental types which has to be given up to …nance the intervention. This
average is precisely the harmonic mean of the marginal utility of consumption
in the parents’ generation.8
The crucial requirement for early intervention to be welfare increasing is its
productivity. Clearly, if the …rst euro invested does not yield anything, i.e.
fwP0(0) = 0, then the introduction of such a program can never be optimal.
But condition (8) elucidates that it is on the other hand not necessary for the
program itself lead to a return in output higher than the amount invested, i.e.
fwP0(g) > 1 for g > 0. In fact, it is the reduction in the poor’s disutility of labor
that bene…ts the society. Therefore, a su¢ciently productive skill formation
technology leads to g￿ > 0. Interestingly, early intervention at a …rst step does
not entail an incentive cost nor an incentive bene…t as the …rst-order conditions
reveal.
Optimal intervention has another interesting e¤ect on the second-generation
poor in addition to an increase in their productivity.
Remark In a welfare optimum with early intervention g￿ > 0, the poor in the
children’s generation are never unemployed.
Proof. If the poor in the children’s generation were unemployed in the opti-
mum, yP = 0, the condition for optimal early intervention (8) would be violated
since the left-hand side would be zero and the right-hand side would be strictly
positive.
The increase in the productivity of the poor increases the opportunity costs
of being jobless. If a poor individual were not employed regularly afterwards,
the intervention program would have created only costs but no bene…ts and
8An intuition for the harmonic rather than the arithmetic or geometric mean is provided
by Kocherlakota (2005, p. 1593 and 1594).
12therefore a welfare loss.
5 Welfare e¤ects
If in the optimum g￿ > 0, then we can be sure that welfare has increased com-
pared to an optimum without early intervention. This is due to a core insight
from optimization theory: the above optimization problem is technically iden-
tical to the standard problem of optimal income taxation without intervention
plus the constraint g = 0. Removing this binding constrain leads to an increase
in the target value.
The decisive questions are which generation bene…ts or loses and, more speci…-
cally, who among each generation is better or worse o¤ due to early childhood
intervention. The common belief is that these programs are introduced in the
interest of the disadvantaged children.
Knowing that the rich are always subject to a zero local marginal tax rate,9 we
can state the following proposition with respect to the parents’ generation:
Proposition 3 Both rich and poor parents are worse o¤ if there is optimal
early childhood intervention g￿ > 0 for the childrend generation.
Proof. Consider the sub-maximization problem for the …rst period. The max-
imum value M of the parents’ generation’s expected utility, u(cp;yp=wp)f +
u(cr;yr=wr)f; which is maximized subject to (2) and the left-hand inequality of
(4), decreases because for it the only e¤ect of g is the negative budgetary e¤ect,
i.e. dM=dg = ￿￿1 < 0.
There are 32 possibilities with respect to the individual utility changes. The
cases where ur remains constant and up increases, ur and up remain constant, ur
and up increase, and ur increases whereas up remains constant can be excluded
right from the start since the maximum value M would not decrease.
9Local marginal tax rates are used to distort the choice of consumption-income-bundles in
order to prevent more productive types from mimicking the adjacent, less productive type.
Since the rich do not have a more productive type who might imitate them, there is no need to
tax the rich in a distortionary way. This is one of the very few robust insights of the standard
Mirrlees model (Hellwig, 2007).
13A scenario with ur remaining constant and up decreasing is not possible either
because r always faces T0r = 0. On each indi¤erence curve there is only one
income-consumption combination which corresponds to this undistorted taxa-
tion because indi¤erence curves are strictly monotonically increasing in income-
consumption-space (Homburg, 2001). Therefore, if up decreases but r still enjoys
its undistorted bundle, either the left-hand incentive compatibility constraint in
(4) becomes slack if the p0s bundle is below r0s indi¤erence curve or the budget
constraint (2) becomes slack if p0s bundle is on r0s indi¤erence curve. Neither of
the situations can be an optimum. A bundle for p above r0s indi¤erence curve
would violate the left-hand constraint (4) and is therefore not feasible.
An increase in ur along a decrease in up would imply that r enjoys more leisure
or more consumption, both of which lead to a lower amount of Tr despite the
increase in g. If this were optimal, such an utility increase for r would have
also been feasible in a setting with g = 0. Since it did not turn out to be
optimal previously, such a utility change is by no means optimal now. A similar
argument holds for a decrease in ur, but an increase in up which would imply an
increase in the poor’s leisure or its consumption, both of which would require a
higher tax load for the rich in addition to g which also needs to be …nanced. A
decrease in ur while up remains constant is not optimal either: suppose it were
optimal, then a decrease in g would leave the poor’s utility una¤ected whereas
the rich would be better o¤. However, this would make it impossible for the
transfer system to redistribute from top to bottom, which is ensured by the
assumption that leisure is non-inferior.
Hence, the only possible case left is that both ur and up decrease which proves
the claim.
By the strict concavity of the parents’ utility as a sum of strictly concave func-
tions, we have the following e¤ects: due to the increased revenue requirement
for both types, leisure becomes more expensive and this drives up both types’
workload. Moreover, as g increases the rich lose because now, besides redistri-
bution, they also have to …nance the provision of intervention. The poor are
also worse o¤ since the extent of redistribution decreases due to provision of g.
There is no positive e¤ect for both parental types that might countervail their
14utility losses.10
Considering the children’s generation, we can state the following:
Proposition 4 The children’s generation in total always bene…ts from optimal
early intervention g￿ > 0. More speci…cly, the rich among the children’s gener-
ation gain from optimal childhood intervention in either case, whereas the e¤ect
on the poor among the children’s generation indetermined.
Proof. Consider the sub-maximization problem for the second period. The
maximum value N of the second generation is given by
N = u(cP;yP=wP(g))f + u(cR;yR=wR)f + ￿2
￿

















(g) > 0; (14)
provided yP > 0. Hence, the second generation bene…ts from g > 0.
To infer the group speci…c utility e¤ects consider the following two extreme
cases. First, suppose that yP = 0 for a certain productivity e wP(g) < wR. The
incentive compatibility constraint would require that the utility levels uP and
uR are, in fact, the same. Second, suppose that e e w
P
(g) = wR = w where again
uP = uR. In such a situation it must hold that yP > 0 since we assumed
mrs(c;0) < wR implying yR > 0:
Starting from the …rst situation, an increase in wP(g) above a threshold wP
such that yP > 0 has one of the following utility e¤ects:11
a) uP increases and uR increases.
b) uP decreases and uR increases.
c) uP remains constant and uR increases.
Out of the 32 potential situations, the cases with uP decreasing and uR remain-
ing constant, uP and uR decreasing, uP remaining and uR decreasing, uP and
10We abstain from modelling altruism since our main interest is the children’s generation,
not the parents’ generation.
11The threshold wP exists since the second extreme case occurs at the very end.
15uR remaining constant can be excluded right away since N would not increase.
The cases where uP increases and uR remains constant and uP increases whereas
uR decreases can also be excluded since utility would no longer be monotone in
type as is required by the downward binding incentive compatibility constraint
(5).
The intuition for the ambiguous e¤ect on the poor among the children’s gener-
ation is as follows. Due to their higher productivity, leisure is more expensive
now than it was for the poor parents. Since the distribution of productivi-
ties has become more equal, the pressure for redistribution has also decreased.
Therefore, the second-generation poor face a double utility loss compared to
a situation without early intervention: …rstly, they receive fewer transfers and
secondly they have to increase their labor supply which creates a higher disutil-
ity from work. Second-generation poor may only gain from early intervention
if the increase in their productivity is su¢ciently high to enjoy consumption
at a level which compensates them for these utility losses. That is, early in-
tervention must be su¢ciently e¤ective to ensure that second-generation poor’s
productivity exceeds an implicit threshold. If we think about the extreme case
of equal productivities of second-generation poor and rich, it is clear that such a
threshold does exist. However, it is the dilemma of the e¢cient provision of the
early intervention program that exceeding this threshold is not always welfare
maximizing (refer to the illustrative simulations below). In fact, optimizing the
extent of redistribution and the size of early intervention programs simultane-
ously means that, in sum, both generations are better o¤. But this does not
necessarily imply that the second-generation poor are better o¤.
However, the second-generation rich always bene…t from a productivity increase
of their poor counterparts. The intuition is straightforward: since their tax
burden decreases as the poor become more productive, they can enjoy more
consumption and need to work less. This e¤ect is monotone in the poor’s
productivity.
The overall welfare increase is - as usual in these extended optimal tax models
- twofold.12 Firstly, there are gains from the skill formation technology by
12See Lohse (2008) for a twofold gain from introducing workfare in an optimal tax-transfer-
16which an increase in the economy’s output can be reached. Secondly, there are
e¢ciency gains. Since the skill distribution becomes more equal, the level of
distortionary taxation can be decreased.
6 Numerical illustration
To illustrate the …ndings, some simulations of optimal tax-transfer schemes with-
out and with early intervention are provided. They clarify the welfare e¤ects
of such programs and show how assumptions about the programs productivity
a¤ect second-best allocations.
Assume a utility function u(ch;lh) = 1;000[ln(ch)+ln(500￿lh)￿11] with 500 as
the maximum time per month. In a scenario without early intervention (which
can be achieved by imposing g = 0 as an additional constraint to the above
maximization problem) the tax system is purely redistributive. Table 1 depicts
the standard optimum without such a program.
Table 1: Standard optimum
Period 1
h w f c y T m T0 u
p 1 30% 315 11 ￿304 ￿ 36% 945
r 3 70% 685 815 130 54% 0% 960
W1= 955
Period 2
h w f c y T m T0 u
P 1 30% 315 11 ￿304 ￿ 36% 945
R 3 70% 685 815 130 54% 0% 960
W2= 955
W = W1 + W2= 1911
The table shows in the …rst three columns the type, the type’s productivity,
and the population size of the poor and the rich, respectively. The next two
scheme.
17columns show consumption and income which are followed by the description
of the tax schedule, i.e. the tax or transfer payments, the discrete and the local
marginal tax rate. The last column shows the utility of the di¤erent types. In
the last line, the overall welfare as the sum of the welfare in each period is given.
Obviously, the allocation is the same in both periods.
Allowing for an early intervention program with i(g) =
p
g
7 ; the second gen-
eration poor are able to increase their productivity thanks to the program.
However, g is costly and has to be …nanced by taxes in the …rst period. Table
2 gives the resulting optimum with an early intervention.
Table 2: Optimal early intervention
Period 1
h w f c y T m T0 u
p 1 30% 310 16 ￿295 ￿ 36% 920
r 3 70% 679 821 142 54% 0% 942
g = 11 W1= 936
Period 2
h w f c y T m T0 u
P 1;48 30% 394 215 ￿179 ￿ 25% 848
R 3 70% 712 788 77 45% 0% 1036
W2= 980
W = W1 + W2= 1915
The second column denotes the poor’s productivity which has increased by
48% due to the implementation of an early intervention program with size g =
11. The second-generation rich are now better o¤, since their tax burden has
substantially decreased. By contrast, the second-generation poor are worse o¤.
They fully participate in the labor market and their transfer income is shortened
by half. Although the parents’ generation has also lost, overall welfare has
increased.
187 Conclusion
This paper supports the positive view of investments in the human capital of
the socially disadvantaged children which is derived from a lifecycle investment
framework as a uni…ed approach of health economics and skill formation theory.
Given that the return from such early intervention programs is su¢ciently large,
their implementation is welfare increasing. We provide an optimality condition
that characterizes the interaction of output, utility, and incentive e¤ects that
go along with such programs. Our results indicate that, while the parents’
generation always loses from early intervention, the rich among the children’s
generation always bene…t. Contrary to the widely hold expectation, the e¤ect on
the poor among the children’s generation - the target group of such programs - is
ambiguous. They may have to work more in return for their bene…cial support.
Consequently, they receive fewer transfers and face an increased disutility of
work which may lead to a decrease in their well-being if the impact of early
intervention on their productivity is not large enough to compensate for this.
In evaluating the model, three caveats come to mind. Firstly, early childhood
intervention programs can easily cover more than two generations, that is, the
second generation would have to …nance early intervention for a third generation
and so on. But, in that case, our model can be seen as a simpli…cation of a
multi-generational intervention process showing the redistributional e¤ects at
the beginning and at the end of that process. Secondly, the present model
takes for granted a positive outcome for early intervention. However, there
is uncertainty about the parents’ cooperation and the individual development.
Hence, the present model may be extended by some stochastic component of
intervention. And thirdly, the Mirrleesian framework does not capture explicitly
all externalities of early intervention (as shown e.g. by Gomby, 2007). This refers
to parential altruism or to bene…cial e¤ects with regard to an improved mental
health or a reducation of criminality. To draw a complete picture, these e¤ects
should be added in future interdisciplinary research.
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